Fifth Amendment--Videotaping Drunk Drivers: Limitations on Miranda\u27s Protections by LeBoeuf, Jacques
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 81
Issue 4 Winter Article 8
Winter 1991
Fifth Amendment--Videotaping Drunk Drivers:
Limitations on Miranda's Protections
Jacques LeBoeuf
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Jacques LeBoeuf, Fifth Amendment--Videotaping Drunk Drivers: Limitations on Miranda's Protections, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
883 (1990-1991)
0091-4169/91/8104-883
THEJouRNA. OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRUMNotOY Vol. 81, No. 4
Copyright @ 1991 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
FIFTH AMENDMENT-VIDEOTAPING
DRUNK DRIVERS: LIMITATIONS ON
MIRANDA 'S PROTECTIONS
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 1 the United States Supreme Court held
that the fifth amendment's prohibition against compelled self-in-
crimination, as interpreted in Miranda,2 did not preclude the intro-
duction at trial of a videotape of a person suspected of operating a
motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, despite the fact
that, at the time of the recording, the suspect had not been in-
formed of his Miranda rights.3 The Court held that the slurred na-
ture of a suspect's speech and related indicia of a lack of muscular
coordination constituted physical, and not testimonial, evidence,
and thus lay outside the scope of Miranda's protections. 4 The Court
ruled that a question requiring a suspect to perform arithmetic cal-
culation constituted an attempt to elicit incriminating testimonial
evidence, and that a response indicating the suspect's inability to
calculate was inadmissible at trial.5 The Court also held that incrim-
inating testimonial evidence offered during the course of routine in-
terrogation designed to obtain information necessary for processing
lay outside the scope of Miranda's protections. 6 Finally, the Court
declined to extend the concept of implicit interrogation to the ad-
ministration of sobriety and breathalyzer tests, and held that incrim-
inating testimonial evidence offered during those procedures was
admissible at trial.7
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate opinion dissenting
from that portion of the ruling which held that a response to a ques-
tion requiring calculation constituted inadmissible testimonial evi-
l 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2652.
4 Id. at 2645.
5 Id. at 2649.
6 Id. at 2650.
7 Id. at 2651-52.
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dence.8 Justice Rehnquist argued that the question did not force
the suspect to face the trilemma of self-incrimination, perjury, or
contempt. 9 Justice Rehnquist agreed with the Court that responses
to questions designed to elicit information necessary for processing
purposes were admissible, but believed it unnecessary to recognize
a special exception for such questions. Rather, he reasoned that
such questions did not place a suspect in the position of facing the
trilemma of truth, falsity, or silence, and thus did not elicit testimo-
nial evidence. 10
Justice Marshall concurred in the opinion only insofar as it held
that a response to a question requiring calculation was testimonial
and therefore inadmissible." Justice Marshall dissented from that
portion of the opinion which recognized an exception for questions
designed to obtain information necessary for processing, believing
that such an exception would undermine one of Miranda's primary
assets-its ease of application-and would lead, consequently, to
time-consuming litigation. 12 Justice Marshall also questioned the
applicability of such an exception, if recognized, to the facts of this
case. 13 Finally, Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's ruling
that incriminating testimony volunteered during the administration
of sobriety and breathalyzer tests was not offered in the course of
custodial interrogation, believing that the administration of such
tests constituted the functional equivalent of express questioning,
defined as questions put to a suspect with the knowledge that they
are likely to elicit incriminating testimony. 14
This Note argues that Justice Marshall's position was substan-
tially correct, and that the entire audio portion of the videotape
should have been ruled inadmissible as testimonial evidence deliv-
ered during express or implicit custodial interrogation. First, Jus-
tice Marshall correctly contended that a response to a question
requiring calculation constituted testimonial evidence. All three
sides of the debate over the physical or testimonial nature of such a
response were misguided, because the distinction between the two
types of questions cannot be made to hinge on whether such a ques-
8 Id. at 2653-54 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part,
and dissenting in part).
9 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dis-
senting in part).
10 Id. at 2654 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part,
and dissenting in part).
1 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12 Id. at 2654-55 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13 Id. at 2655-56 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14 Id. at 2656-57 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tion forces the suspect to face the trilemma of truth, falsity, or si-
lence. This Note argues that, of the many possible policy
foundations for the privilege against self-incrimination, the desire to
avoid the cruel trilemma cannot aid the determination of whether a
given piece of evidence is physical or testimonial. Rather, the deter-
mination can only be made with reference to a fundamental right to
privacy.
This Note disagrees with Justice Marshall over the desirability
of a routine booking question exception to the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. Such an exception is arguably neces-
sary, and can be made to comport with Miranda's bright line rule by
means of an equally clear statement of the questions to which the
exception applies. This Note agrees, however, with Justice Mar-
shall's contention that such an exception, if recognized, could not
be applied to the facts of this case. The necessity of the information
sought would have to be an element of any definition of the excep-
tion, and the facts of this case indicate that the questions put to the
defendant were unnecessary.
Finally, this Note agrees with Justice Marshall's contention that
the Court was wrong in failing to apply the doctrine of implicit inter-
rogation to the facts of this case. Because the police officers had
reason to believe that the defendant would utter incriminating state-
ments while being recorded, and because they quite possibly in-
tended the procedures to elicit such responses, those statements
should have been suppressed as the result of implicit custodial
interrogation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE PROTECTIONS OF MIRANDA
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the fifth amendment provides
that "no person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."' 5 This provision grew out of the maxim
nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, 6 which had long been a rule of evidence
at English common law.17 The maxim, and its subsequent incorpo-
ration into the Constitution, resulted from a universal abhorrence of
the ancient inquisitorial methods of investigation. Under those
methods, embodied in the proceedings of the ecclesiastical courts
and the Star Chamber, a suspect would be put under oath and com-
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16 No one is bound to accuse himself.
17 See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896).
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pelled to incriminate himself.18 Eventually, such methods were de-
nounced as cruel for a number of reasons. The primary motivation
was the belief that such methods forced the suspect to choose be-
tween remaining silent, thereby being in contempt of the court;
speaking falsely, thereby committing perjury; or speaking the truth,
thereby incriminating himself.' 9 This predicament came to be
known as the cruel trilemma.20
In addition to an abhorrence of the cruel trilemma, the
Supreme Court has recognized a number of other policy considera-
tions which provide support for the privilege. In Murphy v. Water-
front Commission of New York Harbor,21 the Court stated that the
privilege was founded on:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice;
our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-
individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual
alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring
the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load;' our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life;' our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our reali-
zation that the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is
often 'a protection to the innocent.' 22
Courts originally interpreted the self-incrimination clause of
the fifth amendment as prohibiting only the extraction of confes-
sions in the course of proceedings conducted under oath. In 1964,
however, the Supreme Court extended protection to confessions
elicited in the course of custodial interrogations conducted by po-
lice.23 In Escobedo v. Illinois,24 the Court ruled inadmissible state-
ments made by a suspect who was ignorant of his rights, deprived of
18 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988). See also Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1976).
19 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See
also Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
20 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
21 ld.
22 Id. (citations omitted); see also Doe, 487 U.S. at 213. The Third Circuit, in Rad
Services, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., compiled a similar list of policy consid-
erations. It stated that "[flour aims in particular support the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege: (1) to discourage inhumane treatment and abuses by the government; (2) to
maintain the appropriate state-individual balance of advantages; (3) to avoid subjecting
persons to the cruel trilemma of self-accusations, perjury, or contempt; and (4) to pro-
tect the private enclave." 808 F.2d 271, 275 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986).




counsel, and interrogated by police for hours while handcuffed and
standing up.25 The Court justified its extension of the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination into the realm of police custo-
dial interrogation by pointing out that such interrogations often cre-
ate in the mind of the suspect the fear that silence will be construed
as an admission of guilt, leaving the suspect to choose between lying
and speaking the truth.26 When it became clear in the years follow-
ing Escobedo that law enforcement officers were finding it difficult to
apply the principles of the case to concrete factual situations, the
Court addressed the issue once again, in order "further to explore
some facets of the problems . . .of applying the privilege against
self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to
follow." 27
As a result, the Court handed down the landmark ruling in Mi-
randa v. Arizona,28 setting forth the now famous procedural safe-
guards which the Court believed would ensure that no suspect's fifth
amendment rights were violated. The Court declared:
[Ihe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or in-
culpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant un-
less it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interroga-
tion, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way. As for procedural safeguards to
25 Id.
26 Id. at 485 (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 562 (1897)). The Court
has on several occasions justified on similar grounds its extension of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against compelled self-incrimination into the realm of custodial interro-
gation. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court stated that "all the principles embodied in the
privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-
custody questioning." 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966). The Court based this ruling, in part,
on its finding that custodial interrogation "contains inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely." Id. at 467.
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, the Court explained the manner in which the concept of
the cruel trilemma could be extended to describe custodial interrogations as well as
proceedings conducted under oath. 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2648 n.10 (1990). The Court
noted that suspects were compelled to speak, not by the threat of contempt sanctions,
but by the 'inherently compelling pressures' recognized in Escobedo. Id. The Court also
noted that the option of speaking falsely was made unavailable, not by the threat of
indictment for perjury, but by the possibility that evidence indicating that a suspect lied
to the police could be used at trial to support an inference of a guilty conscience. Id.
The Court concluded that custodial interrogation functioned as the "modem-day ana-
log of the historic trilemma," because it forced suspects to face three choices which were
closely analogous to those which comprised the cruel trilemma. Id. at 2648-49.




be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform
accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior
to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evi-
dence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attor-
ney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attor-
ney before speaking there can be no questioning. 29
B. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
Although the obvious goal of the Miranda Court was a concrete
rule of law accompanied by a precise statement of those circum-
stances in which the rule applied, it was immediately apparent that
the Court's holding contained at least one major flaw. Specifically,
the Court's ruling, if interpreted literally, would have prohibited law
enforcement officials from obtaining physical evidence. Yet, the
Supreme Court had consistently interpreted the fifth amendment as
providing no bar against compulsion to produce evidence of a real
or physical nature. In Holt v. United States,3° for example, the Court
held that a suspect could be made to don an item of apparel be-
lieved to have been worn by a murderer.3 1 Writing for the Court,
Justice Holmes stated that "the prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it [might] be
material."3 2
Recognizing that Miranda could be construed as prohibiting the
compelled production of physical evidence, the Court quickly
moved to forestall any such interpretation. Just one week after the
Court decided Miranda, it handed down its ruling in Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia.3 3 In Schmerber, the petitioner was convicted of driving under
the influence of alcohol on the basis of an analysis of his blood, a
sample of which had been taken over his strenuous objection while
he was in the hospital. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the
procedure violated his privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
29 Id. at 444-45 (footnote omitted).
30 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
31 Id. at 252-53. The case involved a murder committed on a military reservation. Id.
at 246.
32 Id.
33 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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tion.34 The Court ruled that Miranda's protections did not extend to
such situations, stating that "the privilege protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise pro-
vide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative na-
ture . . . ,,3
The Court extended this reasoning in United States v. Dionisio3 6
and in United States v. Wade.37 In both cases the Court ruled that
suspects could be compelled to repeat aloud a prepared text in or-
der to provide a voice exemplar.38 Similarly, in Gilbert v. California,5 9
the Court ruled that a suspect could be compelled to provide a
handwriting exemplar. 40 Other cases have held that the privilege
against self-incrimination provided no protection against compul-
sion to submit to fingerprinting,4 ' photographing,42 or the taking of
measurements. 4
3
Over the years, the Court has delivered several statements re-
garding the distinction between physical and testimonial evidence.
In Curcio v. United States,44 the Court ruled that fifth amendment con-
cerns were implicated only where a suspect was compelled to "dis-
close the contents of his own mind. ' '45 Similarly, in Wade,46 the
Court held that the fifth amendment privilege extended only to
those situations where the accused was compelled to "disclose any
knowledge he might have"47 or to "speak his guilt." 48 In Couch v.
United States,49 the Court stated that it is the "extortion of informa-
34 Id. at 759.
35 Id. at 761 (footnote omitted).
36 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
37 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
38 In Dionisio, persons suspected of involvement in a gambling racket were compelled
to read prepared text for comparison with recordings obtained through the use of a wire
tap. 410 U.S. at 2 & 2 n.1. In Wade, the defendant, who was suspected of bank robbery,
was compelled in a police lineup before bank employees to repeat words to the effect of
"put the money in the bag," the words allegedly uttered by the robber. 388 U.S. at 220.
39 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
40 The handwriting contained in the exemplar was compared with that contained in a
note used by a bank robber. Id. at 266.
41 United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932) (defendant accused of selling
liquor;, fingerprints were compared with those found on the bottle).
42 Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 417 (1904) (murder suspect identified on
the basis of photograph taken after arrest).
43 United States v. Cross, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 365 (1892) (height of murder suspect
measured to determine whether or not he could have fired the bullet that killed his wife).
44 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
45 Id. at 128.
46 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
47 Id. at 222.
48 Id. at 223.
49 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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tion from the accused himself that offends our sense of justice." 50
Finally, in Doe v. United States,5 1 the Court stated that "in order to be
testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information." 52
C. THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLICIT INTERROGATION
On two occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination may be invoked not
only when a suspect is subjected to explicit interrogation, but also
when the suspect is subjected to implicit interrogation. The Court
based this extension of Miranda's protections on its belief that, be-
cause certain situations subject a suspect to the same inherently
compelling pressures as do interrogations, those situations operate
as the functional equivalents of express interrogation.
In Rhode Island v. Innis,53 the leading case in this area, the Court
first recognized, in dicta, this genre of compulsion. In Innis, a man
suspected of armed robbery was arrested and informed of his Mi-
randa rights. He then requested to speak with an attorney, and in
accordance with the proscriptions of Miranda, all interrogation
ceased. While he was being transported to the station, the three
police officers accompanying him discussed the missing weapon.
One of the officers, noting the proximity of the scene of the crime to
a school for disabled children, observed that there were "a lot of
handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid
one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt
themselves."'54 The suspect's more humane inclinations thus
aroused, he instructed the police to turn the car around, and he led
them to the spot where he had hidden the shotgun. 55 This evidence
was used to convict him.56
While the Court held that the technique employed by the of-
ficers did not constitute interrogation for the purposes of Miranda,57
the Court nonetheless significantly expanded its definition of inter-
rogation for purposes of Miranda.58 The Court explained,
50 Id. at 328.
51 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
52 Id. at 210.
53 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
54 Id. at 294-95.
55 Id. at 295.
56 Id. at 296.
57 Id. at 303.
58 Innis is widely recognized as greatly expanding the type of conduct considered to
be interrogation. See, e.g., Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 526-27 (1987) (after Innis,
interrogation for the purposes of Miranda was not limited to express questioning).
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IThe Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in cus-
tody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent. That is to say, the term 'interrogation' under Miranda re-
fers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions
on the part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect.... A practice that the
police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating re-
sponse from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. 59
The Court stressed the fact that its expanded definition of inter-
rogation "focuse[d] primarily on the perceptions of the suspect,
rather than on the intent of the police."' 60 The Court further indi-
cated that "[a]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the
unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persua-
sion might be an important factor in determining what the police
should have known .... ,,61 The Court concluded, however, that
even this expanded definition was of no avail to Innis, since there
was "nothing in the record to suggest that the officers were aware
that the respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his
conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children." 62
While the Supreme Court has yet to apply the doctrine of im-
plicit interrogation recognized in Innis, it recently reaffirmed its
commitment to it. In Arizona v. Mauro,63 the suspect confessed to
having killed his son before invoking his right to counsel.64 In ac-
cordance with the proscriptions of Miranda, all interrogation ceased.
Later, when the suspect's wife requested to speak to him, the police
consented only on the conditions that an officer be present and that
the conversation be recorded.65 At trial, the prosecution intro-
duced into evidence the recording of the conversation to rebut
Mauro's defense of temporary insanity.66 In a narrowly divided
opinion,67 the Supreme Court ruled that the police officers' actions
did not rise to the level of implicit interrogation. 68 The Court rea-
soned that even though the police knew that Mauro was likely to
make incriminating statements while speaking to his wife,6 9 there
was no evidence showing that their intent in allowing the conversa-
59 Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 (footnotes omitted).
60 Id. at 301.
61 Id. at 302 n.8.
62 Id. at 302.
63 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
64 Id. at 521-22.
65 Id. at 522.
66 Id. at 523.
67 Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented.
68 Mauro, 481 U.S. at 527.
69 Id. at 528 n.6.
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tion only in the presence of an officer was to elicit incriminating
statements. 7
0
D. THE EXCEPTION FOR ROUTINE BOOKING QUESTIONS
One final limitation on the privilege against compelled self-in-
crimination creates an exception for routine booking questions.
The exception finds its genesis in the passage from Innis7l ex-
cerpted above,72 where the Court indicated that the protections of
Miranda extended to police actions "other than those normally at-
tendant to arrest and custody..."73 Relying on this phrase, appel-
late courts have recognized another exception to the protections of
Miranda. For example, in United States v. Horton,74 the Eighth Circuit
stated that "Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary
to complete booking or pretrial services."'75 Similarly, in Gladden v.
Roach,76 the Fifth Circuit held that "biographical questions, which
are part of the booking routine and are not intended to elicit damag-
ing statements, are not interrogation for fifth amendment purposes.
Thus, it is permissible for officers to ask straightforward questions
to secure the biographical data necessary to complete the booking
process." 77 Finally, in United States v. Gotchis,78 the Second Circuit
ruled that "[r]outine questions about a suspect's identity and mari-
tal status, ordinarily innocent of any investigative purpose, do not
pose the dangers Miranda was designed to check . . . -79 Similar
sentiments have been expressed by a majority of the courts of
appeals.80
70 Id. at 528. Note that the Court appears to have modified the test for implicit inter-
rogation. Compare this reasoning with the Court's statement in Rhode Island v. Innis
that the test "focused primarily on the perceptions of the suspect, rather than on the
intent of the police." 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
71 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
72 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
73 446 U.S. at 300-01.
74 873 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1989).
75 Id. at 181 n.2.
76 864 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3192 (1989).
77 Id. at 1198.
78 803 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1986).
79 Id. at 79.
80 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 799 F.2d 126, 128 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1093 (1987) (stating that "[o]rdinarily, the request for identifying information,
however phrased, is inherently ministerial and does not violate Miranda"); United States
v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905 (1984) (stating
that "[o]rdinarily, however, the routine gathering of biographical data for booking pur-
poses should not constitute interrogation under Miranda"); Robinson v. Percy, 738 F.2d
214, 219 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that "Miranda does not apply when officers ask a sus-
pect routine processing questions"); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th
[Vol. 81892
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Although prior to this case the Supreme Court had not directly
addressed the exception for routine booking questions, it nonethe-
less expressed its approval. In South Dakota v. Neville,81 the Court
ruled that evidence concerning a suspect's refusal to be subjected to
a blood-alcohol test could be admitted at trial.8 2 The Court con-
cluded that such' a fefusal, being the product of a choice, was not
coerced by the requesting officer, and thus could not be considered
the result of interrogation for the purposes of Miranda.83 In arriving
at this conclusion, the Court raised and rejected the argument that a
police officer's inquiry into whether a suspect wished to submit to
the test constituted interrogation for the purposes of Miranda.84
The Court based this decision on an exception, grounded in the lan-
guage from Innis, for routine booking questions, and on its finding
that the police inquiries in question were in fact quite routine and
"highly regulated."8 5
E. STATE OF THE LAW
The carnage on our nation's highways caused by the operation
of motor vehicles by inebriated drivers is an increasingly vexing
problem. As a result, many states have recently enacted strict drunk
driving laws, and many law enforcement agencies have begun utiliz-
ing a number of innovative methods of ensuring that violators are
brought to justice. The use of videotapes has proved to be an effec-
tive means of accomplishing this result, and is becoming increas-
ingly widespread. 6 Prior to this case, the Supreme Court had not
addressed the question of the admissability at trial of the evidence
thus obtained. A number of state courts, however, had done so, and
most had agreed that the fifth amendment did not bar the introduc-
tion at trial of the video portions of the tapes at issue.8 7 A similar
consensus had not emerged, however, with regard to the audio por-
tions of the tapes. Some state courts had allowed admission at trial
Cir. 1981) (stating that "[o]rdinarily, the routine gathering of background biographical
data will not constitute interrogation").
81 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
82 Id. at 564.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 564 n.15.
85 Id.
86 The use of videotapes for this purpose is common in several states, including
Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Texas. Note,
Self-Incrimination Issues in the Context of Videotaping Drunk Drivers: Focusing on the Fifth Amend-
ment, 10 HAtv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 631, 631 n.2 (1987) [hereinafter Note].
87 See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1979); People v. Fenelon, 14 Ill.
App. 3d 622, 303 N.E.2d 38 (1973).
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of the entire audio portions of such tapes,88 some admitted only
those portions of the audiotapes which were free from incriminating
testimonial statements,8 9 and some regarded the entire audio por-
tions as inadmissible testimonial evidence. 90
III. FACTS
Early on the morning of November 30, 1986, Officer David
Spotts of the Upper Allen, Pennsylvania, Police Department noticed
the automobile of the defendant, Inocencio Muniz, stopped on the
shoulder of Route 15 with the engine running and the hazard lights
flashing.91 Officer Spotts, believing that Muniz's vehicle was dis-
abled, parked his patrol car a short distance away and approached it.
When he arrived at the vehicle, he observed Muniz sitting in the
driver's seat and a passenger sitting beside him.92 Officer Spotts
asked Muniz if he could be of any assistance, but Muniz informed
him that he had just stopped to urinate.93 Officer Spotts detected a
strong odor of alcohol of Muniz's breath; he also noticed that
Muniz's eyes were glazed and bloodshot, that his face was flushed,
and that his coordination was poor.94
Believing that Muniz was intoxicated, Officer Spotts twice in-
structed him to remain parked on the shoulder until he was sober.95
Muniz assured Spotts that he would. 96 Spotts began walking back to
his patrol car, but before he reached it, he heard Muniz pull back
onto the highway and drive away.97 Officer Spotts pursued Muniz,
and, after they had traveled approximately half of a mile, he acti-
88 See, e.g., Palmer, 604 P.2d at 1110 (holding that "even if the statements made by the
accused were testimonial in character, they were not the product of the sort of custodial
'interrogation' that requires a Miranda warning.")
89 See, e.g., State v. Roadifer, 346 N.W.2d 438, 441 (S.D. 1984), where the court
stated that:
Were the audio tapes merely to show the manner of [the suspect's] attempt to count
backwards or recite the alphabet as requested, we would see no real distinction
from the rule on admission of photographic evidence. We hold, however, that in
any instance where the contents are admissions regarding his condition, they would
be testimonial in nature and clearly fall within the protection of the Fifth
Amendment.
90 See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 435 P.2d 191, 194 (Okla. Crim. 1965) (stating that "[i]f
the films had been taken with the consent of defendant.., they would have been admis-
sible - without sound") (emphasis omitted).
91 Commonwealth v. Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. 382, 383-84, 547 A.2d 419, 420 (1988).
92 Id. at 384, 547 A.2d at 420.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2641 (1990);Joint Appendix at 14, Penn-
sylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990) (No. 89-213) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].




vated his warning lights and instructed Muniz to pull over.98 Spotts
requested Muniz's driver's license and automobile registration. 99
Muniz fumbled through his wallet, dropping several cards in the
process, and produced his Social Security card and what appeared
to be his United States Department of Agriculture farm labor
card. 100 Eventually, Muniz managed to provide Spotts with the re-
quested information. 10 Spotts then asked Muniz to step out of the
car. 10 2
Officer Spotts proceeded to administer three sobriety tests-
the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the "walk and turn" test, and the
"one leg stand" test. 03 In Officer Spotts's opinion, Muniz failed
each test.10 4 During the administration of the tests, Muniz informed
Spotts that he had been drinking and that he was drunk.' 05 Muniz
explained that his inability to perform the tests satisfactorily was due
to his advanced state of inebriation. 10 6 Officer Spotts then placed
Muniz under arrest and transported him to the West Shore facility
of the Cumberland County Central Booking Center.'0 7 Officer
Spotts did not advise Muniz of his Miranda rights.' 08 En route to the
booking center, Muniz again volunteered statements concerning his
state of inebriation.10 9
Upon Muniz's arrival at the booking center, an employee re-
corded information such as his name, his date of birth, and the iden-
tity of the arresting officer. 110 The booking center routinely
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.; Joint Appendix, supra note 95, at 18.
101 Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. at 384, 547 A.2d at 420.
102 Id.
103 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2641 (1990). Administration of these
three tests is recommended by The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The
horizontal gaze nystagmus test measures the jerking of the eyes as they gaze to the side,
a phenomenon which, while evident in the eyes of a sober person, is more pronounced
in the eyes of an intoxicated suspect. The walk and turn test requires the subject to walk
heel-to-toe along a straight line for nine paces, turn, and walk back the same way, count-
ing aloud from one to nine in each direction. The one leg stand test requires the subject
to stand on one leg for thirty seconds, counting aloud from one to thirty. Little effort is
required to imagine the heightened difficulty which these tests pose to the intoxicated
subject. See U.S. Dep't of Transp., Improved Sobriety Testing, USDOT-NHTSA HS-
0806512 (Aug. 1989), reorinted in 1 R. ERWIN; M. MINZER, L. GREENBERG & H. GoLD-
STEIN, DEFENSE or DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 8A.99, at 8A-42 to 8A-51 (3d ed. 1989).
104 Joint Appendix, supia note 95, at 19.
105 Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. at 384, 547 A.2d at 420.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 384-85, 547 A.2d at 420.
108 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2642 (1990).
109 Joint Appendix, supra note 95, at 20-21.
110 Respondent's Brief at 30, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990) (No. 89-
213) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
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videotapes persons suspected of driving under the influence of alco-
hol in order to preserve a record of their condition."' In accord-
ance with this policy, Muniz, after providing the requested
information, was informed by Jerry Hosterman, a processing officer
at the booking center, that his actions and voice were to be re-
corded. Officer Hosterman did not advise Muniz of his Miranda
rights. 112
In the first segment of the videotaped procedures, Officer Hos-
terman asked Muniz his name and address." 3 In order to provide
the second piece of information, Muniz found it necessary to look in
his wallet for a card with the address on it.114 The officer then asked
Muniz his height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current
age." 5 Muniz informed the officer that his date of birth was April
19, 1947, but he gave his current age as 49. He then laughed, hit his
head with his hand, and said, "I mean 39."116 The officer then
asked Muniz the date of his sixth birthday. Muniz first uttered an
inaudible response and then informed his interviewer that he was
unable to calculate that date.1 7
In the second segment of the videotaped procedures, Officer
Hosterman administered the same three sobriety tests administered
by Officer Spotts at roadside."" The videotape showed that
Muniz's eyes jerked noticeably during the gaze test, that he could
not walk a straight line, and that he could not balance himself on
one leg for more than a few seconds." 9 Furthermore, during the
one leg stand test, Muniz, who had been requested to count aloud
from one to thirty, managed to count in Spanish only from one to
six, skipping the number two. During the walk the line test, he did
not count at all.120 Finally, at several points Muniz requested clarifi-
cation of the tasks he was expected to perform and attempted to
explain his difficulties in performing those tasks by reference to his
advanced state of inebriation.' 2 '
Procedure at the booking center required that suspects be allot-
III Brief of Petitioner at 7, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990) (No. 89-
213) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
112 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2642.
113 Id.
114 Respondent's Brief, supra note 110, at 3.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2642.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2657 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121 Id. at 2642 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ted twenty minutes for the administration of the sobriety tests and
for observation. 122 Since Muniz completed his tests in six minutes,
he was required to sit for fourteen minutes. During that time he
conversed with Officer Hosterman' 123 Finally, in the third segment
of the videotaped procedures, an employee at the booking center,
Lisa Deyo, explained Pennsylvania's Implied Consent Law124 to
Muniz and requested his permission to administer a breath test
designed to measure his blood alcohol level. 125 Deyo informed
Muniz that his refusal to take the test would result in the automatic
suspension of his driver's license for a year.' 26 Muniz asked a
number of questions about the law, again commenting on his state
of inebriation. 127 He offered to submit to the test only after waiting
for a few hours or drinking some water.' 28 When this request was
denied, Muniz refused to be subjected to the test. At this juncture
Muniz was finally advised of his Miranda rights. 129
IV. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Muniz was tried on May 27, 1987 at a bench trial before the
Honorable George Hoffer in the Court of Common Pleas of Cum-
berland County.' 30 At trial, the court admitted into evidence both
the audio and video portions of the videotape, with the exception of
the fourteen-minute portion recorded after the administration of
the sobriety tests.' 3 ' The court also admitted testimony relating to
the roadside sobriety tests administered by Officer Spotts.' 3 2 At the
trial's conclusion, the court found Muniz guilty of driving under the
influence of alcohol in violation of Pennsylvania's drunk driving
statute. 33
Muniz filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the trial
122 Id. at 2657 n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123 Id. at 2642 n.2
124 The law, codified at 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. sec. 1547 (Purdon 1977 & Supp.
1990), provides that individuals driving on Pennsylvania roads are presumed to have
consented to have their blood alcohol level checked.
125 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2642.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2652.
129 Id. at 2642.
130 Commonwealth v. Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. 382, 385, 547 A.2d 419, 421 (1988).
131 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2642.
132 Id.
133 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. sec. 3731(a)(1) (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1990). Since
Muniz had been convicted of the same offense in 1985, the court ordered him to pay the
costs of prosecution and a $310 fine, and sentenced him to imprisonment in the Cum-
berland County prison for a period of not less than forty-five days nor more than twenty-
three months. Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. at 385, 547 A.2d at 421.
1991] 897
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
court's refusal to exclude the testimony relating to the roadside so-
briety tests and the videotape recorded at the booking center vio-
lated his fifth amendment rights.'8 4 The trial court denied the
motion on the grounds that the evidence extracted from Muniz
prior to his being informed of his Miranda rights was physical and
not testimonial; therefore, a Miranda warning was not required.'8 5
Muniz appealed this judgment to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania.
In an opinion filed on September 8, 1988, the superior court
reversed the trial court's decision.'8 6 The court first noted that the
protections afforded by Miranda applied only to testimonial or com-
municative evidence, and not to physical evidence.'3 The court
then surveyed several Pennsylvania cases distinguishing physical
and testimonial evidence, arriving at the conclusion that testimonial
evidence was "essentially communicative in nature"18 or revealed a
suspect's thought processes.18 9 The court pointed out that, while
sobriety tests generally produced physical evidence, such tests
sometimes yielded testimonial evidence.' 40 When this occurred,
Miranda protections applied. 14 1 The court held that Muniz had
been subjected to questioning that elicited information revealing his
thought processes, and that the admission of Muniz's videotaped re-
sponses therefore constituted reversible error.' 42 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth's application for re-
view, 143 and the United States Supreme Court granted the Com-
monwealth's petition for certiorari. 144
V. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
To be protected by the privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation, evidence must satisfy three criteria: (1) the evidence must
be of a testimonial nature; (2) it must be the product of custodial
interrogation, either express or implicit; and (3) it must not be the
134 Muniz, I10 S. Ct. at 2642.
135 Id. at 2642-43.
136 Commonwealth v. Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. 382, 547 A.2d 419 (1988).
137 Id. at 386, 547 A.2d at 421 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761
(1966). See supra text accompanying notes 33-35 for a discussion of Schmerber.
138 Commonwealth v. Bruder, 365 Pa. Super. 106, 113-14, 528 A.2d 1385, 1388
(1987), cited in Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. at 388, 547 A.2d at 422.
139 Commonwealth v. Conway, 368 Pa. Super 488, 498-500, 534 A.2d 541, 546-47
(1987), cited in Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. at 389, 547 A.2d at 422-23.
140 Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. at 387, 547 A.2d at 422.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 390-91, 547 A.2d at 423.
143 522 Pa. 575, 559 A.2d 36 (1989).
144 110 S. Ct. 275 (1989).
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result of routine booking questions. In this case, the Court was
faced with the task of applying these three criteria to four aspects of
the videotaped procedures: (1) the generally slurred nature of
Muniz's speech; (2) Muniz's responses to the first seven questions;
(3) his response to the question regarding the date of his sixth birth-
day; and (4) his statements volunteered during administration of the
sobriety tests and explanation of the breathalyzer test.
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, 145 ruled that the po-
lice had not violated Miranda principles in acquiring the evidence in
question, with the exception of Muniz's response to the question
concerning the date of his sixth birthday.' 46 The Court held that
the generally slurred nature of Muniz's speech throughout the vide-
otaped procedures constituted physical, not testimonial, evidence,
and thus lay outside the protections of Miranda.147 Muniz's re-
sponses to the first seven questions, while testimonial and the result
of custodial interrogation, fell under the exception for routine book-
145 The composition of the panels of'Justicesjoining in each of the several opinions is
a marvel of complexity. As a result, the opinion of the Court sometimes reflects a major-
ity and sometimes a plurality.
Specifically, the portion of the Court's opinion concluding that the generally slurred
nature of Muniz's speech constituted admissible physical evidence (summarized infra in
subsection (1)), and the portion of the Court's opinion concluding that Muniz's utter-
ances during administration of the sobriety tests and during explanation of the
breathalyzer test were not the results of interrogation (summarized infra in subsection
(4)), both announced by Justice Brennan, were joined in by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice Marshall
filed an opinion dissenting from both portions. The portion of the Court's opinion con-
cluding that Muniz's response to the sixth birthday question constituted inadmissable
testimonial evidence (summarized infra in subsection (2)), announced by Justice Bren-
nan, was joined by Justices Marshall, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens, filed an opinion dissenting
from this portion of the Court's opinion.
Finally, the portion of the opinion recognizing an exception to Miranda's protec-
tions for routine booking questions (summarized infra in subsection (3)), announced by
Justice Brennan, was a plurality opinion joined in by Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Ken-
nedy. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens, deliv-
ered a separate plurality opinion concurring in the result reached by the first plurality,
but reasoning that Muniz's responses to the booking questions were admissible, not
because they fell under an exception for routine booking questions, but because they
were not testimonial. Justice Marshall dissented from the result reached by both plural-
ity opinions.
For the sake of simplicity, Justice Brennan's opinion shall be referred to as the ma-
jority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist's as the concurrence, and Justice Marshall's as
the dissent.
146 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2652 (1990).
147 Id. at 2644.
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ing questions, and thus lay outside the protections of Miranda.148
Muniz's response to the question regarding the date of his sixth
birthday, however, fell outside the routine booking question excep-
tion, and thus was improperly admitted at trial. 149 Finally, Muniz's
volunteered statements during the administration of the sobriety
tests and during the explanation of the blood-alcohol test, while tes-
timonial, were not the products of custodial interrogation, and so
lay outside the protections of Miranda.'5 0
1. The Slurred Nature of Muniz's Speech
The Court' 5 ' first addressed the question of whether the gener-
ally slurred nature of Muniz's speech constituted physical or testi-
monial evidence. The Court noted that its decision in Schmerber v.
California152 indicated that the privilege against compelled self-in-
crimination did not extend to compulsion to provide evidence of a
physical nature. 153 The Court then noted that the distinction be-
tween physical and testimonial evidence drawn in Schmerber had
been extended in United States v. Wade,154 where the Court had ruled
that a suspect could be compelled to repeat a phrase provided by
police to enable witnesses to listen to his voice. In that case, the
Court stated that such a procedure involved "compulsion of the ac-
cused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to dis-
close any knowledge he might have."'155
The Court also noted that it had applied similar reasoning in
United States v. Dionisio,15 6 where it ruled that suspects could be com-
pelled to read a prepared text in order to provide voice exemplars
for comparison with recordings obtained through the use of wire
taps. In Dionisio, the Court stated that the voice recordings "were to
be used solely to measure the physical properties of the witnesses'
voices, not for the testimonial or communicative content of what
was to be said.' 1 57 Finally, the Court noted its ruling in Gilbert v.
148 Id. at 2650.
149 Id. at 2649.
150 Id. at 2651-52.
151 Justices Marshall, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy joined in this portion ofJustice
Brennan's opinion.
152 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See supra text accompanying notes 33-35 for further discus-
sion of this case.
153 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2644.
154 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text for further dis-
cussion of this case.
155 Id. at 222, quoted in Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2645.
156 410 U.S. I (1973). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion of this case.
157 Id. at 7, quoted in Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2645.
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California158 that a suspect could be compelled to provide a hand-
writing exemplar for comparison with a robbery note. In Gilbert, the
Court had stated that a handwriting exemplar, "in contrast to the
content of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identify-
ing physical characteristic outside [the privilege's] protection." 159
The Court concluded that, under Schmerber and its progeny, evi-
dence of Muniz's slurring of speech and related indicia of a lack of
muscular coordination constituted admissible physical evidence.1 60
The Court drew an analogy between this case and the voice exem-
plar cases, concluding that "[r]equiring a suspect to reveal the phys-
ical manner in which he articulates words, like requiring him to
reveal the physical properties of the sound produced by his voice,
... does not, without more, compel him to provide a 'testimonial'
response for the purposes of Miranda."' 61
2. The Sixth Birthday Question
The Court 62 then addressed the somewhat more difficult ques-
tion of whether Muniz's response to the question regarding the date
of his sixth birthday constituted physical or testimonial evidence.
The difficulty stemmed, in part, from the assertion of the Common-
wealth and of the United States as amicus curiae that, since Muniz's
response allowed the trial court to make an inference concerning
"the physiological functioning of [Muniz's] brain,"' 163 the response
therefore constituted physical evidence. The Court dismissed this
assertion, pointing out that the question of whether evidence is
physical or testimonial hinges not on the nature of the ultimate fact
to be inferred from the evidence but rather on the method in which
the evidence is obtained. In support of this contention, the Court
observed that in Schmerber, 64 it ruled that a suspect could be com-
pelled to provide a blood sample for measurement of its alcohol
content, because the manner in which the evidence was obtained
"did not entail any testimonial act on the part of the suspect."' 65
The Court then noted that had the police simply asked Schmerber
whether his blood-alcohol level was impermissibly high, the evi-
158 388 U.S. 263 (1967). See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this case.
159 Id. at 266-67, quoted in Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2645.
160 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2645.
161 Id. (citation omitted).
162 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia
and Kennedy joined in this portion ofJustice Brennan's opinion.
163 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 111, at 21, quoted in Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2646.
164 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
165 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2646.
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dence thus acquired would have been testimonial.' 66 In both cases,
the ultimate fact to be inferred would have been physiological in
nature. 167
Having rejected the Commonwealth's version of the test for de-
termining whether evidence is physical or testimonial, the Court set
about devising the proper test. The Court began by quoting at
length a passage from Doe v. United States, 168 where the Court had
reviewed several statements regarding the distinction between phys-
ical and testimonial evidence. In addition to the passages from
Wade, 16 9 Couch, 1 70 and Curcio 171 excerpted above,' 7 2 the Doe Court
quoted Wigmore as writing that "[u]nless some attempt is made to
secure a communication-written, oral, or otherwise-upon which
reliance is to be placed as involving [the accused's] consciousness of
the facts and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand
made upon him is not a testimonial one."'173
The Court then surveyed the policy considerations behind the
privilege, as expressed in a passage from Murphy v. Waterfront Com-
mission of New York Harbor174 excerpted above. 175 In the Court's
view, the most fundamental policy consideration was "our fierce un-
willingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma
of self-accusation, perjury or contempt."' 176 The Court then rea-
soned that, because the privilege against self-incrimination was
based primarily on a desire to avoid the use of the cruel trilemma,
evidence should be considered testimonial, and therefore protected
by the privilege, whenever a suspect must face "the modem-day an-
alog of the historic trilemma .... -177
The Court then demonstrated that the test thus stated com-
ported with recent cases distinguishing between physical and testi-
monial evidence. The Court noted that neither compulsion to
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
169 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
170 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
171 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
73 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw 386 (1961 & Supp. 1990),
quoted in Doe, 487 U.S. at 211; id., quoted in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638,
2646-47 (1990).
174 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
175 See supra text accompanying note 22.
176 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2647 (citing Doe, 487 U.S. at 212).
177 Id. at 2647-48. Under the 'modern-day analog' of the traditional trilemma, the
suspect is in police custody, and the option of remaining silent is rendered unavailable




provide a voice exemplar, upheld in Wade,17 8 nor compulsion to
produce a sample of handwriting, upheld in Gilbert,17 9 required the
suspect to reveal his thoughts or beliefs, and so neither situation
forced a suspect to face the cruel trilemma. The Court also noted
that, in Doe,180 it ruled that a suspect could be compelled to sign a
consent form, phrased in the hypothetical, waiving a privacy interest
in bank records. Since execution of the waiver did not require the
assertion of any of the suspect's beliefs, but rather amounted to only
a "nonfactual statement,"''1 the suspect was not placed intothe
cruel trilemma, and so the evidence was physical and not
testimonial.' 8 2
Having validated this test, the Court proceeded to apply it to
the facts of this case. The Court concluded that the question re-
garding the date of Muniz's sixth birthday called for a testimonial
response. The Court recalled its reasoning in Miranda,183 where it
had stated that, because informal custodial interrogations exerted
extraordinary pressures on suspects, one horn of the trilemma-the
option of remaining silent-is ex hypothesi unavailable in such situa-
tions.' 8 4 When asked to calculate the date of his sixth birthday,
Muniz was left with the choice of answering truthfully-i.e., stating
that he was incapable of performing the requested calculation-
thereby incriminating himself, or delivering a response which he did
not know to be truthful, thereby incriminating himself.'8 5 The
Court concluded that Muniz's response was therefore testimonial
and should have been suppressed.
3. The First Seven Questions
Justice Brennan' 86 next addressed the question of whether the
seven questions asked by Officer Hosterman just prior to the sixth
birthday question-questions regarding Muniz's name, address,
height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age-consti-
tuted interrogation. The Commonwealth argued that since the
booking questions were innocent of any investigative purpose---i.e.,
since the content of Muniz's responses was not to be used to prove
178 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
179 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
180 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
181 Id. at 213 n.l1.
182 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2648-49.
183 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
184 Id. at 467, cited in Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2648 n.10.
185 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2649.
186 This portion ofJustice Brennan's opinion represents a plurality of the Court. Jus-
tice Brennan was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
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his intoxication-the questions did not constitute interrogation.18 7
In rejecting this argument, Justice Brennan stated that the test to
determine whether questions asked by police officers constituted in-
terrogation hinged not on the intent of the police, but rather on the
perceptions of the suspect.188
To support this view, the plurality reviewed the history of the
definition of the term 'interrogation.' The plurality first noted that
Miranda ' 8 9 defined interrogation as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers."' 90 The plurality then noted that Innis 19 1and
Mauro192 extended that definition to encompass the "functional
equivalent" of direct questioning. 193 The plurality further noted
that in Innis the term 'functional equivalent' was defined to include
"any words or actions on the part of police (other than those nor-
mally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect."194
The plurality concluded that, under the definition of interroga-
tion set forth in Mauro and Innis, the seven questions asked of Muniz
by Officer Hosterman just prior to the sixth birthday question con-
stituted custodial interrogation for the purposes of Miranda. How-
ever, the plurality held that Muniz's responses were admissible,
because they fell within the exception for routine booking ques-
tions, which "exclud[ed] from Miranda's coverage questions to se-
cure the 'biographical data necessary to complete booking or
pretrial services.' "195 Since Muniz's responses were sought "for
record-keeping purposes only,"' 196 and since they appeared "rea-
187 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 111, at 15-16; Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2649-50. Although
the plurality addressed the issue of whether Muniz's responses were the result of inter-
rogation, it is not clear that the Commonwealth's contention was that Muniz was not
being interrogated. The Commonwealth's petition can also be read as arguing that,
while the questions posed by Officer Hosterman constituted interrogation, Muniz's re-
sponses did not qualify as testimonial.
188 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650.
189 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
190 Id. at 444, quoted in Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650.
19' 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
192 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
193 Id. at 526, quoted in Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650.
194 Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (footnotes omitted).
195 Muniz, 110 S. Ct at 2650 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
12, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990) (No. 89-213)). The government's
brief, in turn, quoted United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989).
196 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650 (quoting Commonwealth v. Muniz, 377 Pa. Super 382,
390, 547 A.2d 419, 423 (1988)). Note that in the state court opinion, the excerpted
words were immediately preceded by the word "ostensibly." The state court concluded
that Muniz's responses to the booking questions were inadmissible. Muniz, 377 Pa.
Super at 390, 547 A.2d at 423.
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sonably related to the police's administrative concerns,"1 97 those re-
sponses fell within the exception and therefore did not require
suppression.198
4. The Sobriety and Breathalyzer Tests
Finally, the Court1 99 addressed the question of whether the in-
criminating statements volunteered by Muniz during the administra-
tion of the sobriety tests and explanation of the breathalyzer test
constituted testimonial responses elicited in the course of custodial
interrogation. The Court once again sought to determine whether
Muniz was being interrogated during the second and third segments
of the videotaped procedures. 20 0 The Court concluded that he was
not being interrogated, and that his incriminating utterances there-
fore constituted voluntary statements falling outside the protections
of Miranda.20
In support of its conclusion, the Court noted that both Officer
Hosterman's instructions during the administration of the sobriety
tests and Officer Deyo's explanation of the legal implications of the
result of the breathalyzer test were "carefully scripted. ' 20 2 The
Court believed that, with two minor and unchallenged excep-
tions,20 3 the instructions and questions posed by the police officers
"were not likely to be perceived as calling for any verbal re-
sponse" 20 4 and therefore did not constitute interrogation for the
purposes of Miranda.
B. CONCURRING OPINION
Chief Justice Rehnquist 2°5 concurred with the plurality's con-
clusion that Muniz's responses to the seven booking questions were
admissible, and dissented from the majority's conclusion that
Muniz's response to the question regarding the date of his sixth
197 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650.
198 Id. See infra note 248 and accompanying text for a recitation of the Court's some-
what conclusory language.
199 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia
and Kennedy joined in this portion of Justice Brennan's opinion.
200 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2651.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 2651-52.
203 The exceptions were Officer Hosterman's request that Muniz count aloud during
administration of the walk-the-line test and the one-leg-stand test and Officer Deyo's
inquiries into whether Muniz understood the legal consequences of the result of the
breathalyzer tests.
204 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2651.
205 Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens joined ChiefJustice Rehnquist.
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birthday constituted inadmissible testimonial evidence.20 6 Chief
Justice Rehnquist believed that none of Muniz's responses consti-
tuted testimonial evidence. 20 7 The Chief Justice arrived at both of
these conclusions by refining and applying the 'cruel trilemma' test
utilized by the plurality, concluding that none of the eight questions
asked of Muniz by Officer Hosterman placed Muniz into the
trilemma.
Chief Justice Rehnquist first addressed the majority's conten-
tion that, because the sixth birthday question required Muniz to
choose between incriminating himself and answering untruthfully,
the question was designed to elicit a testimonial response. Chief
Justice Rehnquist applied the majority's 'cruel trilemma' test to
Muniz's predicament and concluded that Muniz was not placed into
the trilemma.208 The ChiefJustice first stated that an untruthful re-
sponse would not have supported an inference of a guilty con-
science.20 9 Accordingly, he argued, Muniz was under no pressure to
avoid giving a truthful answer. "Muniz would no more have felt
compelled to fabricate a false date than one who cannot read the
letters on an eye-chart feels compelled to fabricate false letters
"210
Chief Justice Rehnquist also argued that there was no distinc-
tion between the sobriety tests, designed to measure Muniz's physi-
cal coordination, and the sixth birthday question, intended to gauge
Muniz's "mental coordination." 21 1 Since the police were not inter-
ested in the content of Muniz's response, but rather were only at-
tempting to determine the "functioning of Muniz's mental
processes," Muniz's response constituted admissible physical
evidence. 2 12
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist applied the same test to the
seven questions asked by Officer Hosterman just prior to the sixth
birthday question, arriving at the conclusion that the responses to
206 Id. at 2653-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part,
and dissenting in part).
207 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dis-
senting in part).
208 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dis-
senting in part).
209 Id. at 2653 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part,
and dissenting in part).
210 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dis-
senting in part).
211 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dis-
senting in part).




those questions were not testimonial in nature.213
C. DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's opinion, except for
its holding that Muniz's response to the sixth birthday question con-
stituted inadmissible testimonial evidence. 2 14 He disagreed with the
plurality's recognition of a routine booking question exception to
Miranda's protections and expressed doubt that such an exception, if
recognized, could properly be applied to the facts of this case.2 15
Justice Marshall also found fault with the Court's failure to apply the
doctrine of implicit interrogation to the second and third segments
of the videotaped procedures, arguing that the proper test, if ap-
plied, would have resulted in a finding that the administration of the
sobriety tests and explanation of the breathalyzer test constituted
the functional equivalents of express interrogation. 216 Finally, Jus-
tice Marshall disagreed with the Court's ruling that Officer Hos-
terman's request that Muniz count aloud during two of the three
sobriety tests did not constitute custodial interrogation. 217 He ar-
gued that, since the instructions were designed to reveal evidence
which would have supported an inference concerning the function-
ing of Muniz's mind, they constituted impermissible custodial
interrogation.218
Justice Marshall first addressed the plurality's recognition of an
exception to the protection of Miranda for routine booking ques-
tions.219 Such an exception, argued Justice Marshall, would contra-
vene one of Miranda's chief assets-its ease of application.220 "Such
exceptions undermine Miranda's fundamental principle that the doc-
trine should be clear so that it can be easily applied by both police
and courts." 22 1 Justice Marshall argued that recognition of the ex-
ception would lead to frustrating and time-consuming litigation
over whether particular questions fell within the exception. 222
Additionally, Justice Marshall argued that such an exception,
213 Id. at 2654 (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part,
and dissenting in part).
214 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215 Id. at 2655-56 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216 Id. at 2656-57 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217 Id. at 2657-58 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
218 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219 Id. at 2654-55 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
220 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221 Id. at 2654 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
222 Id. at 2655 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1991) 907
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
even if recognized, could not properly be applied to the facts of this
case. He pointed out that even those jurisdictions which recognized
the exception do not consider it applicable where ostensibly inno-
cent booking questions are designed to produce incriminating testi-
monial evidence. 223 Since the facts of this case revealed that the
police should have known that the booking questions were reason-
ably likely to elicit an incriminating response from an intoxicated
suspect, Muniz's responses to those questions should have been
suppressed. 24
Justice Marshall next responded to ChiefJustice Rehnquist's as-
sertion that none of Muniz's responses to the eight booking ques-
223 Id. at 2655-56 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Marshall cited the following for support: United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1024-
25 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905 (1984) (stating that "[e]ven a relatively in-
nocuous series of questions may, in light of the factual circumstances and the suscepti-
bility of a particular suspect, be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response");
United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that excep-
tion does not apply if "the questions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse in a particular situation"); United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 816 n.18
(11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982) (ruling that "[e]ven questions that are
usually routine must be proceeded [sic] by Miranda warnings if they are intended to
produce answers that are incriminating").
224 Id. at 2655-56 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In discuss-
ing the exception for routine booking questions,Justice Marshall incorporated elements
of his discussion of the doctrine of implicit interrogation. Justice Marshall argued, in
effect, that because the police intended to elicit incriminating responses, the exception
should not have been held to apply. This only clouds the issue. Knowledge on the part
of police that a suspect will be lead to make incriminating statements is useful only in
determining whether the suspect is being interrogated. Discussion of the exception for
routine booking questions, however, assumes that the suspect is being interrogated.
An alarming number of the courts of appeals have misinterpreted the Court's alter-
native definition of interrogation contained in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291
(1980), in a similar manner. In Innis, the Court stated that it did not approve of the
narrow construction of Miranda wherein the definition of interrogation was limited to
express questioning. Id. at 299. Rather, the Innis Court stated that "the term 'interroga-
tion' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or
actions on the part of police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. (citations omitted). The test so
stated is phrased in the alternative, and yet a surprising number of lower courts have
phrased it in the additive. Under this interpretation, 'interrogation' for purposes of Mi-
randa includes only those actual questions which the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response. Thus, in United States v. Morrow, 731 F.2d
233, 237 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984), the Fourth Circuit ruled that
booking questions did not constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes, because,
although they were actual questions, they were not reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response. Similarly, in United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1024 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905 (1984), the Sixth Circuit concluded that booking ques-
tions did not constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes, because they were not re-
lated to criminal activity. These opinions represent an increasing tide that the Supreme
Court would do well to stem.
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tions constituted, testimonial responses. 225 Justice Marshall argued
that all of the questions, not only the sixth birthday question, placed
Muniz into the cruel trilemma, and that his responses were there-
fore testimonial. 226
Justice Marshall then addressed the majority's ruling that the
incriminating statements volunteered by Muniz during the second
and third segments of the videotaped procedures were not delivered
in response to custodial interrogation. 227 Justice Marshall argued
that, had the Court properly applied the doctrine of implicit interro-
gation recognized in Innis,228 it would have arrived at the conclusion
that Officers Hosterman's and Deyo's words and actions amounted
to the functional equivalents of express interrogation. 229 Justice
Marshall reasoned that, while administration of sobriety tests and
explanation of a breathalyzer test "would not prompt most sober
persons to volunteer incriminating statements," such procedures
should reasonably have been expected to have that result on a visi-
bly intoxicated person. 230 Furthermore, because Muniz had ex-
plained his paltry performance on the roadside sobriety tests with
reference to his advanced state of inebriation, the police had every
reason to believe that the same tests performed in the station would
have the same result. 23 1
Justice Marshall chided the majority for ignoring Muniz's par-
ticular susceptibility to sobriety tests, already exposed to Officer
Spotts, and for concentrating instead on the nature of Hosterman's
and Deyo's words and actions. 2 2 Justice Marshall pointed out that
in ignoring Muniz's condition, the Court contradicted its formula-
tion in Innis of the doctrine of implicit interrogation.233 He recalled
that the Innis Court particularly emphasized that, in determining
whether police conduct rises to the level of implicit interrogation,
the focus is not on the words and actions of the police viewed in
isolation, but rather on the effect which the police have reason to
believe their actions will have.2 4 Moreover, the Innis Court had in-
dicated that any knowledge that the police had concerning the unu-
sual susceptibility of a particular suspect to particular forms of
225 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2656 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227 Id. at 2656-57 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
229 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2656 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
232 Id. at 2657 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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implicit interrogation would be relevant in a determination of
whether the police's expectations of the effects of their conduct
were reasonable.23 5 Given all of this, Justice Marshall argued, Of-
ficers Hosterman's and Deyo's conduct amounted to the functional
equivalent, of express interrogation, and Muniz's utterances in re-
sponse to that conduct should have been suppressed.23 6
Finally, Justice Marshall took issue with the Court's ruling that
Officer Hosterman's request that Muniz count aloud during the
walk-the-line test and the one-leg-stand test did not amount to cus-
todial interrogation designed to elicit incriminating testimonial evi-
dence.237 Justice Marshall first noted the majority's concession of
the fact that Hosterman, in directing Muniz to count aloud, was en-
gaged in custodial interrogation.238 He then argued that, because
the manner in which Muniz counted-or failed to count-supported
an inference concerning his state of mind, Muniz's utterances were
therefore testimonial.23 9 Finally, Justice Marshall argued that the
responses were incriminating, because the prosecution sought to in-
troduce them at trial. 24°
Justice Marshall concluded that all of Muniz's utterances during
all three segments of the videotaped procedures constituted testi-
monial responses to custodial interrogation, and that the entire au-
dio portion of the videotape should have been suppressed.
VI. ANALYSIS
The Court's ruling in this case presents several striking exam-
ples of result-oriented jurisprudence. First, at one point in the
opinion, the Court severely abbreviated its discussion of a doctrine,
allowing it to avoid the obvious conclusion that any formulation of
the doctrine would have led to a result contrary to that reached by
the Court. Specifically, the Court confined its discussion of the ex-
ception for routine booking questions to three sentences, 24 1 and
cited in support of its recognition of the doctrine only the Brief of
the United States as amicus curiae and, by reference, a footnote in one
235 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237 Id. at 2657-58 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238 Id. at 2657 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
240 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.5 (1980)). The Innis Court had stated that "[b]y 'incriminat-
ing response' we refer to any response-whether inculpatory or exculpatory-that the
prosecution may seek to introduce at trial." Id. (emphasis in original).
241 Id. at 2650.
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court of appeals case cited therein.242
Second, at two points in the opinion, the Court achieved sub-
stantially the same result by placing its discussion of a doctrine in an
improper and logically bizarre place, obviating the need to raise the
doctrine where it would have detracted from the Court's conclusion.
Specifically, the Court discussed the doctrine of implicit interroga-
tion in its analysis of the first segment of the videotaped proce-
dures, 243 where such a discussion was totally unnecessary. This
allowed the Court to avoid discussion of the doctrine in its analysis
of the second and third segments of the videotaped procedures, 24
where such discussion would have led to the conclusion that the ele-
ments of the doctrine had been satisfied. The second instance of
this phenomenon was the Court's placement of its discussion of the
sixth birthday question 245 prior to its discussion of the routine
booking question exception,246 which obviated an explanation of
why the booking question exception did not apply to the sixth birth-
day question. Because such an explanation would necessarily have
addressed the question of the necessity of the information sought, it
would have led to the conclusion that few, if any, of the seven ques-
tions asked just prior to the sixth birthday question fell within the
exception.
Finally, all three sides of the debate over whether or not certain
questions placed Muniz into the cruel trilemma missed the point.
Of the many policy foundations for the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination, a desire to avoid the cruel trilemma cannot be
used as a basis for distinguishing between physical and testimonial
evidence. Rather, that distinction should be made to hinge on con-
siderations of a fundamental right to privacy.
A. RECOGNITION AND APPLICABILITY OF AN EXCEPTION FOR ROUTINE
BOOKING QUESTIONS
In recent years, numerous lower courts have recognized an ex-
ception from Miranda's coverage for routine booking questions. 247
Notwithstanding Justice Marshall's contention that such an excep-
tion may not be desirable, it is difficult to imagine efficient adminis-
tration ofjustice if police are precluded from obtaining information
necessary to processing. For this reason, the plurality correctly rec-
242 Id. (citing United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989)).
243 Id. at 2649-50.
244 Id. at 2650-52.
245 Id. at 2645-49.
246 Id. at 2650.
247 See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
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ognized the exception. The plurality erred, however, in failing to
devote more than three sentences 248 to recognition of the doctrine
and to its application to the facts of this case.
Justice Marshall's fear-that the exception will contravene Mi-
randa's ease of application and will lead, subsequently, to time-con-
suming litigation-is well-founded. This apprehension could have
been allayed, however, by a definition of the exception that is as
well-reasoned and easily understood as the rule which it aims par-
tially to supplant. The Court could have stated that responses to
booking questions would be admitted at trial only if the questions
were routine and if the information sought was both necessary to
complete booking or pretrial processing and unavailable from any
alternative source. Many of the courts of appeals which have recog-
nized the exception for routine booking questions have defined the
doctrine in this manner.249
Additionally, the Court could have provided a list of those
questions the answers to which would be considered admissible at
trial. Such a course of action would have comported with the
bright-line quality of Miranda and would have substantially met Jus-
tice Marshall's objection. It is somewhat surprising that the Court,
feeling itself obliged to announce a new doctrine of such far-reach-
ing consequences, particularly one subject to such well-founded
criticisms as those voiced by Justice Marshall, should fail to establish
any of the contours of the doctrine.250
248 The plurality's discussion of the doctrine was as follows:
[The plurality concluded that Muniz's responses to the booking questions were tes-
timonial and elicited in the course of custodial interrogation.] We agree with ami-
cus United States, however, that Muniz's answers to the first seven questions are
nonetheless admissible because the questions fall within a 'routine booking ques-
tion' exception which exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the 'bi-
ographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.' The state court
found that the first seven questions were 'requested for record-keeping purposes
only,' and therefore the questions appear reasonably related to the police's adminis-
trative concerns. In this context, therefore, the first seven questions asked at the
Booking Center fall outside the protections of Miranda and the answers thereto
need not be suppressed.
Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650 (citations omitted).
249 See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text for further discussion of these cases.
250 Concededly, it is a well-known maxim that cases, particularly constitutional cases,
should be decided as narrowly as possible. Courts therefore generally attempt to avoid
announcing new doctrines or substantial refinements of existing doctrines. The situa-
tion changes, however, when a court feels that it has no choice but to announce new law.
In such cases, while the court should not attempt to define the doctrine with such speci-
ficity as to ordain its applicability (or lack thereof) to unknown factual scenarios, the
court is obliged to offer a cogent exposition of the doctrine sufficient to explain its appli-
cability to the facts of the case at hand. Failure to do so subverts the rule of law.
Moreover, Miranda embodies an exception to the general rule. In response to the
confusion that followed Escobedo, the Miranda Court decided the case very broadly, de-
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This discussion has assumed that if police were required to is-
sue Miranda warnings prior to booking, they would thereby be pre-
vented from obtaining information which they require. This
assumption is unwarranted. Suspects could be compelled to pro-
vide biographical information, but that information could not be in-
troduced at trial unless it had been obtained through an
independent source. The process of obtaining the information
could be simplified if police informed suspects that responses to
booking questions could not be used against them at trial.251
Any of these suggested modes of analysis would have been su-
perior to that utilized by the plurality represented by Justice Bren-
nan; yet, the plurality did not discuss any of them. Nor did the
plurality provide any support for its own analysis. This uncharacter-
istic taciturnity might have been due to a desire to avoid an un-
wanted result. The plurality's refusal to discuss thoroughly the
exception for routine booking questions might well have been due
to a realization that such a discussion would have lead to the conclu-
sion that the booking questions in this case could not be made to fall
under the exception.
Any exception for routine booking questions could not be
made to extend to the questions in this case for a number of rea-
sons. First, the entire booking process was far from routine. The
Commonwealth conceded that it did not videotape the booking of
those charged with other crimes.252 Rather, the videotaping process
is reserved only for those suspected of driving under the influence
of alcohol. As Justice Marshall pointed out, this fact alone is suffi-
cient to raise doubts as to the purpose of the questions asked during
the booking process. 253
Moreover, it is apparent from the facts of the case that none of
the questioning conducted while the camera was engaged was nec-
tailing with minute specificity not only the contours of the doctrine but also the law
enforcement procedures which would suffice to forestall constitutional questions in sub-
sequent adjudications. To recognize an exception to Miranda as vague and as poorly-
reasoned as the one announced in this case is inconsistent with the spirit of Miranda, and
would allow the Rehnquist Court to undo in three sentences what the Warren Court
achieved in a hundred and ten pages.
251 Muniz appeared to put forth the slightly different proposition that police could
simply disregard the requirement, fail to provide the Miranda warnings prior to booking,
and then not attempt to introduce the evidence so acquired at trial: "Requiring Miranda
warnings for all custodial questioning would not prevent police from obtaining bio-
graphical information .... Rather, it would simply prevent responses to those inquiries
from being used in the prosecution's case in chief against the defendant." Respondent's
Brief, supra note 110, at 27 n.6.
252 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 111, at 7.
253 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2655 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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essary for processing. The police did not need to know the date of
Muniz's sixth birthday in order to process him. Furthermore, Of-
ficer Hosterman did not need to ask Muniz's current age, since
Muniz, in response to the previous question, had already provided
Hosterman with his date of birth. Similarly, Muniz's eye color,
height and weight could have been ascertained without Muniz's
cooperation.
In fact, Muniz's driver's license, which Officer Spotts had al-
ready examined, contained all of the information requested by Of-
ficer Hosterman. That information probably appeared on several
other pieces of identification which Muniz was carrying, all of which
were placed into police custody upon his arrest. It is fair to con-
clude that the police possessed all of the information they needed to
process Muniz.
The last, and most compelling, piece of evidence showing that
the recorded questioning was unnecessary is Officer Hosterman's
admission, made at a pretrial hearing, that Muniz had already pro-
vided the police with all of the information necessary to processing
prior to his being brought before the camera. Hosterman explained
his initial contact with Muniz as follows: "Well, we take the initial
questions, name, date of birth, so forth, the arresting officer. And
then he is brought into the room in front of the video camera and
the processing is started. ' 254 It is difficult to conceive of how the
plurality could possibly have ignored the fact that, in a very real
sense, Muniz had already been booked before the videotaped proce-
dures commenced.
Finally, Justice Brennan's transposition of his discussion of the
sixth birthday question and his discussion of the routine booking
question exception merits comment. The plurality discussed the
sixth birthday question prior to discussing the booking exception,
despite the fact that the opposite order would have been more logi-
cal. Had the plurality addressed the issues in the more logical man-
ner, it would have reasoned that the booking questions fell under
the exception, but that the sixth birthday question, being neither
necessary nor routine, fell outside that exception. The plurality
would have been compelled, however, to explain why the sixth
birthday question fell prey to objections that were not equally appli-
cable to the other questions. In other words, it would have been
necessary for the plurality to state why the sixth birthday question
was unnecessary in a way in which the other questions were not.
Such an explanation would have been impossible. Justice Brennan
254 Respondent's Brief, supra note 110, at 30.
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avoided this difficulty by transposing his discussion of the two
issues.
B. THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLICIT INTERROGATION
The Court's treatment of the doctrine of implicit interrogation
leaves much to be desired. The Court's failure to apply the doctrine
to the facts of this case, especially in light of similar refusals to apply
the doctrine to the facts of the two cases in which the Court previ-
ously discussed it,255 indicates an intent to eviscerate the doctrine
before ever utilizing it. Any sensible formulation of the doctrine
consistent with the reasoning behind it would have led in each of the
three cases to the conclusion that the police conduct in each case
constituted the functional equivalent of express interrogation. Fi-
nally, the Court's placement of its discussion of the doctrine in the
section of its opinion dealing with the express interrogation of
Muniz by Officer Hosterman, where a discussion of implicit interro-
gation was totally unnecessary, can only be taken as a sign that the
Court wished to avoid discussion of the doctrine in the section of its
opinion dealing with the administration of the sobriety tests and ex-
planation of the breathalyzer test, where a discussion of implicit in-
terrogation would have led to the conclusion that the words and
actions of the police constituted the functional equivalent of express
interrogation.
In Rhode Island v. Innis,256 the Court explained that the test for
determining whether or not police conduct rose to the level of im-
plicit interrogation hinged on the question of whether, given what
the police knew about the suspect, they should have known that
their conduct was likely to elicit an incriminating response. 257
While the Court stated that the test focused primarily on the percep-
tions of the suspect rather than on the intent of the police, the Court
also added that:
[t]his is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant, for it may
well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that
their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating
response. In particular, where a police practice is designed to elicit an
incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice
will not also be one which the police should have known was reason-
ably likely to have that effect.258
255 Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291
(1980).
256 446 U.S. 291.
257 Id. at 301.
258 Id. at 301 n.7.
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In other words, while the Court believed that it would be un-
necessary to examine the intent of the police, it based that belief on
its reasoning that the knowledge of the likelihood of a given result
would always be present where there was an intent to bring about
that result. The Court reasoned that whenever a person intends to
produce a given result, that person should know that the result is
likely to obtain.
The Court's reasoning reflects a fundamental misunderstand-
ing of human motivation. An individual will engage in a course of
action, not only when the course of action is more likely than not to
have the desired effect, but also when the benefit of the desired ef-
fect, discounted by the chance that it will not obtain, is greater than
the effort required to engage in the attempt.
Everyone engages in this type of cost-benefit analysis every day,
and police officers are no exception. Police officers, if they are ra-
tional, will attempt to trick a suspect into confessing, not only when
they think that they will succeed, but any time they believe that the
rewards-either to them personally or to the law enforcement pro-
cess in general-are sufficiently high to make the attempt worth
their while. Since the effort required is often minimal (recall that
the officers in Innis needed only to engage in a conversation), and
since the rewards to the law enforcement process might be per-
ceived as being great, the implication is that such attempts will be
commonplace.
Had the Innis Court given sufficient thought to the issue, it
would have phrased the test for implicit interrogation in the alterna-
tive. In other words, implicit interrogation should be defined as
either conduct which the police should know is reasonably likely to
evoke an incriminating response, or conduct which the police intend
will evoke such a response. Such an approach would be more con-
sistent with the basic assumptions underlying the Court's reasoning
than was the test on which the Court ultimately settled.
The Court's failure to formulate a sensible test for the doctrine
of implicit interrogation, and its subsequent failure to apply the doc-
trine to the facts of Innis, comprised the first step in the evisceration
of the doctrine. The second step was the Court's refusal to recog-
nize that even its own formulation of the test was satisfied by the
facts of Mauro.259 The Mauro Court agreed with the state court's
finding that the police officers were aware of the possibility that
Mauro would incriminate himself if allowed to talk to his wife.260 In
259 446 U.S. 520 (1987).
260 Id. at 528.
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fact, the police officers believed that incrimination was not only pos-
sible, but likely. The Court specifically stated that it was not over-
turning the lower court's finding that the police "knew that ...
incriminating statements were likely to be made." 26 1 Yet, the Court
ruled that their decision to allow the conversation did not amount to
implicit interrogation. 262 The Court based this ruling on its belief
that "[t]here [was] no evidence that the officers sent Mrs. Mauro in
to see her husband for the purpose of eliciting incriminating state-
ments ... "263 The Mauro Court's ruling was flatly inconsistent with
its statement of the doctrine in Innis.
The final step in the evisceration of the doctrine of implicit in-
terrogation was the Court's failure to apply the doctrine to the facts
of this case. Justice Marshall's argument that the police had every
reason to know that their conduct would evoke incriminating state-
ments from Muniz is undoubtedly correct. First, as Justice Marshall
pointed out, the police "had good reason to believe,"264 based on
their observations, that Muniz was intoxicated. It is also common
knowledge that intoxicated persons, when thrust into strange cir-
cumstances and required to perform what to them are difficult tasks,
often become confused. Officers Hosterman and Deyo, then, had
every reason to know that Muniz would have difficulty understand-
ing what was required of him during administration of the sobriety
tests, and that he would voice his confusion. Since lack of ability to
understand and follow the instructions given during these tests is
considered evidence of intoxication, 265 Muniz's questions during
explanation of the tests constituted incriminating testimonial
evidence.
Second, the police also had good reason to believe that Muniz
would volunteer incriminating statements during administration of
the sobriety tests. Muniz explained his failure to perform the three
roadside sobriety tests satisfactorily by reference to his advanced
state of inebriation. The state court found that "[d]uring the field
sobriety tests, Muniz readily admitted that he had been drinking,
that he was drunk, and that he could not perform the various tasks
required because he was too inebriated." 266 Moreover, Officer
Spotts testified that Muniz made several more incriminating state-
261 Id. at 528, 529 n.6.
262 Id. at 530.
263 Id. at 528.
264 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2656 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
265 Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. 382, 389, 547 A.2d 419, 423 (1988) (quoting Common-
wealth v. Conway, 368 Pa. Super 488, 498-500, 534 A.2d 541, 546-47 (1987)).
266 Muniz, 377 Pa. Super. at 384, 547 A.2d at 420.
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ments while en route to the booking center.267 Given all of this, the
police had every reason to know that Muniz would continue to make
incriminating statements once at the station. Given Muniz's mis-
guided attempt to excuse his poor performance during administra-
tion of the roadside sobriety tests, there was absolutely no reason to
believe that he would not offer the same excuses while attempting to
complete the same exercises before the camera.
Because the police officers had good reason to know that their
words and actions would have the likely effect of eliciting incriminat-
ing testimony from Muniz, the Court should have regarded their
conduct as falling precisely under its test for implicit interrogation.
Had the Court applied the broader version of the test suggested
here, under which intent forms an alternative basis for a finding of
implicit interrogation, the result would have been even more ines-
capable. As Justice Marshall suggested, so many aspects of the po-
lice conduct at issue could have served no other purpose than to
elicit incriminating testimony that such a result must have been in-
tended. 268 As Justice Marshall noted, this conclusion is buttressed
by the booking center's policy of allotting a mandatory period of
twenty minutes for completion of the sobriety tests and for observa-
tion. As Justice Marshall observed, "[g]iven the absence of any ap-
parent technical or administrative reason for the delay and the
stated purpose of 'observing' Muniz, the delay appears to have been
designed in part to give Muniz the opportunity to make incriminat-
ing statements." 269
Finally, the Court's misplacement of its discussion of the doc-
trine of implicit interrogation also merits comment. The Court
raised the issue of implicit interrogation in the course of its discus-
sion of the first segment of the videotaped procedures, when Officer
Hosterman asked Muniz the eight booking questions. As the Court
pointed out, Miranda defined the term 'interrogation' as "question-
ing initiated by law enforcement officers." 270 It is difficult to con-
ceive of a dearer case of custodial interrogation than that recorded
in the first segment of the videotaped procedures. Yet, the Court
chose this section of its opinion to raise the issue of implicit interro-
gation, only to reach the conclusion that, while the questioning did
in fact constitute interrogation, Muniz's responses were admissible
as the result of routine booking questions. The Court neglected to
267 Joint Appendix, supra note 95, at 21.
268 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2657 & 2657 n.2 (Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
269 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
270 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), quoted in Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650.
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raise the issue of implicit interrogation in its discussion of the sec-
ond and third segments of the videotaped procedures, when Of-
ficers Hosterman and Deyo administered the sobriety tests and
explained the legal ramifications of the breathalyzer test, respec-
tively. At no point in this section of its opinion did the Court so
much as mention the doctrine or cite to Innis or Mauro. Discussion
of the doctrine, nonsensical where the Court placed it, would have
made more sense in this section. More importantly, application of
the doctrine to the circumstances surrounding the sobriety and
breathalyzer tests would have led to the conclusion that the police
conduct during those procedures constituted the functional
equivalent of express questioning. Once again, the Court avoided
an undesirable result by rearranging its opinion.271
C. SIMPLIFICATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
Another troubling aspect of the Court's opinion is its reliance
on an abhorrence of the cruel trilemma to distinguish physical and
testimonial evidence. Justice Brennan's plurality held that Muniz's
responses both to the sixth birthday question and to the seven book-
ing questions constituted testimonial evidence.272 Chief Justice
Rehnquist disagreed, believing that none of Muniz's responses to
those questions constituted testimonial evidence.273 Justice Mar-
shall agreed with Justice Brennan, 274 but added that Muniz's count-
ing aloud during the sobriety tests also constituted testimonial
evidence. 275 All three positions, however, rely on an improper
method for distinguishing between physical and testimonial
evidence.
The question which all three sides viewed as dispositive was
whether Muniz was placed into the cruel trilemma. In applying the
concept of the cruel trilemma to informal proceedings conducted in
police custody, it is important to bear in mind that one horn of the
dilemma-the option of remaining silent-is ex hypothesi unavaila-
ble.276 A guilty suspect is thus left with the choice of speaking truth-
271 An alternative explanation for the odd placement of the discussion of implicit in-
terrogation is that the Court made the mistake discussed supra in note 224, whereby the
definition of interrogation is restricted to include only actual questions intended to elicit
incriminating responses.
272 Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2649-50.
273 Id. at 2653-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring with the result in
part, and dissenting in part).
274 Id. at 2654 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
275 Id. at 2657 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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fully, thereby incriminating himself, or speaking untruthfully,
thereby allowing an inference of a guilty conscience.
An application of the Court's test to situations where the de-
sired outcome is intuitively obvious is useful in analyzing its efficacy.
In other words, a determination of whether or not the Court's cruel
trilemma test is sensible cannot be made without first considering
what result the test would reach when applied to evidence of an ob-
viously physical nature.
Consider first the case of an accountant who has embezzled cor-
porate assets while maintaining two sets of books. One set cleverly
conceals the thefts, so that close examination, while revealing that
the ledger was a forgery, would not reveal the exact nature of the
crime. 277 When presented with a subpoena and instructed to ap-
pear in formal proceedings, the accountant confronts the classic ver-
sion of the trilemma: she may fail to produce either set of books and
be jailed for contempt; produce the falsified set and risk indictment
for committing a fraud upon the court; or produce the true set and
incriminate herself. If the accountant is not subpoenaed, but is in-
stead requested to produce the books during informal custodial in-
terrogation, perhaps by a police officer lacking a warrant, she is
placed in the 'modem-day analog' of the historic trilemma: the op-
tion of refusing is unavailable, due to the inherent pressures to com-
ply with the request of the police officer. Only two options are
available to the accountant: produce the falsified set and risk an in-
ference of a guilty conscience;278 or incriminate herself by produc-
ing the true set.
The analogy is consistent as well with situations where the falsi-
fication of physical evidence is impossible or easily detected. Con-
sider an accountant who has been able to concoct only a poor
forgery which does not effectively conceal his crimes. If police re-
quest the books during an informal investigation, the accountant is
left with two choices: produce the real set, thereby incriminating
himself, or produce the poorly falsified set, thereby incriminating
himself and allowing the inference of a guilty conscience. The evi-
dence in question is undoubtedly physical, and yet the accountant's
position is indistinguishable from that of Muniz when confronted
with the sixth birthday question.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the cruel trilemma test
is an inappropriate vehicle for determining whether evidence is
277 The paradigm presents an example of a situation where the production of falsified
physical evidence is possible.
278 This option assumes that examination of the falsified set would reveal its falsified
nature without providing any additional proof of wrongdoing.
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physical or testimonial in nature. Since the distinction between
physical and testimonial evidence cannot be made to rest on a desire
to avoid the modern-day analog of the cruel trilemma, it must be
made to rest on another of the policy considerations underlying the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. In particular, the dis-
tinction should be made with reference to the more analytically sim-
ple concept of a fundamental right to privacy.279
The Supreme Court and many lower courts have indicated that
a respect for a right to privacy is one of the most important consid-
erations behind the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. In Couch v. United States,280 for example, the
Court stated that the privilege "respects a private inner sanctum of
individual feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to ex-
tract self-condemnation." 28' Similarly, in United States v. Grune-
wald,28 2 Judge Frank stated that the privilege acts as a "safeguard of
the individual's 'substantive' right of privacy, a right to a private en-
clave where he may lead a private life." 283 Later, in Murphy v. Water-
front Commission of New York Harbor,28 4 the Supreme Court relied on
Judge Frank's statement, writing that the privilege was founded on,
inter alia, "our respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he
may lead a private life,' ",285 Two years later, the Court echoed this
concern in Miranda,2s 6 where it stated that one of the principles be-
hind the privilege was a respect for "the inviolability of the human
personality." 28 7
279 An alternative means of distinguishing between physical and testimonial evidence,
and one which has been gaining support, focuses on the extent to which the evidence
acquired is within the exclusive domain of, and its production therefore alterable by, the
suspect. One writer has stated,
[w]hen evidence is uniquely under the control of the defendant (as when it is in his
mind), the potential for police misconduct is much greater than when the defendant
is incapable of affecting the evidence sought. An interrogation of a kidnapping sus-
pect to determine the location of the missing child, for instance, is likely to get
much nastier much more quickly than a simple procedure for obtaining a suspect's
blood type or fingerprints.
Note, supra note 86, at 634. Of course, were this mode of analysis chosen, the police
practices at issue in this case could not be considered attempts to elicit testimonial evi-
dence, both because inebriated suspects are almost by definition incapable of behaving
in a sober fashion, and because any police misconduct would appear on the videotape.
280 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
281 Id. at 327.
282 233 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
283 Id. at 581-82 (Frank, J., dissenting).
284 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
285 Id. at 55.
286 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
287 Id. at 460. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Court
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A distinction between physical and testimonial evidence based
on this policy consideration is evident in numerous cases cited by
the Court. In many of these cases, evidence that discloses the con-
tents or functioning of a suspect's mind is considered testimonial.
For example, in Curcio,28 8 the Court stated that testimonial evidence
was evidence the delivery of which compelled the suspect to "dis-
close the contents of his own mind." 289 Similarly, in Wade,290 the
Court held that evidence was testimonial only if the accused, in or-
der to provide the evidence, was compelled to "disclose any knowl-
edge he might have." 291 Finally, in Doe,292 the Court stated that "in
order to be testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information." 293
At several points in its opinion, the Court mentions a distinc-
tion between physical and testimonial evidence based upon consid-
erations of privacy. The Court was not content, however, simply to
leave the distinction there. Rather, the Court used the privacy dis-
tinction as a departure for the much more complex discussion of
whether or not a given situation placed a suspect into the cruel
trilemma. For instance, the Court stated that "the cases upholding
compelled writing and voice exemplars did not involve situations in
which suspects were asked to communicate any personal beliefs or
knowledge of facts, and therefore the suspects were not forced to
choose between truthfully and falsely revealing their thoughts." 294
This predilection appears to be due to the Court's belief that the
two criteria will generally be satisfied simultaneously. Justice Bren-
nan wrote that "[w]henever a suspect is asked for a response requir-
ing him to communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or
belief, the suspect confronts the 'trilemma' of truth, falsity, or si-
lence and hence the response (whether based on truth or falsity)
contains a testimonial component." 295 As the extended metaphor
above indicates, however, such is not necessarily the case. The
Court, it seems, made a mistake very similar in nature to the one it
stated that the privilege "enable[d] the citizen to create a zone of privacy which govern-
ment may not force him to surrender to his detriment." Id. at 484.
288 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
289 Id. at 128.
290 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
291 Id. at 222.
292 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
293 Id. at 210.
294 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct 2638, 2648 (1990).
295 Id. (citation omitted).
922 [Vol. 81
VIDEOTAPING DRUNK DRIVERS
made in Innis29 6 described above.297 Both mistakes involved the
substitution of one test for another, based on the assumption that
when the one test is satisfied, the other is satisfied as well.
The Court would do better to rely on a simpler test. Conced-
edly, under a test focusing solely on a right to privacy, the contours
of the distinction between physical and testimonial evidence would
need to be defined without the benefit of the type of seemingly ana-
lytically rigorous tripartite test of which judges are so fond. None-
theless, the end result would conform more closely to our notion of
the purposes behind the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination.
D. SUGGESTED DOCTRINAL REFINEMENTS
This analysis of Muniz has shown that a number of doctrinal
refinements would simplify future discussion of the issues raised in
the case. First, while recognition of an exception to the protections
of Miranda for routine booking questions is desirable, such an ex-
ception should be narrowly construed. Specifically, the Court
should state that responses to such questions will be admitted only
if the questions are routine and the information sought is both nec-
essary for administration and unavailable from any alternate source.
In addition to specifying those criteria, the Court could provide a
list of permissible questions. Such a course of action would mini-
mize the tension between Miranda's bright-line qualities and the ne-
cessity for the exception.
Second, the Court should refine its definition of implicit inter-
rogation to include both conduct which police should know is rea-
sonably likely to elicit incriminating testimony and conduct which
police intend to have that effect. Such a definition would comport
with the reasoning used by the Court in the case where the doctrine
was first announced. The Court should also make it clear that actual
questioning will always constitute interrogation for the purposes of
Miranda, regardless of whether or not the questions are designed to
elicit incriminating testimony.
Third, the Court should abandon the cruel trilemma test as a
basis for determining whether evidence is physical or testimonial,
and it should adopt in its place a simple test focusing on a funda-
mental right to privacy. Numerous courts have applied such a test,
and it is easier to apply and yields results which are more consistent
with intuitive notions of the distinction.
296 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
297 See supra text following note 258.
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Finally, the practice addressed in this case-of introducing at
trial the audio portions of videotapes of suspects recorded prior to
reading of Miranda warnings-should be abandoned as hopelessly
unworkable. In its place, the Court should state that law enforce-
ment officers wishing to preserve a record of a suspect's slurring of
speech should use the practice, commonly utilized in other contexts,
of requiring the suspect to repeat aloud previously prepared or spo-
ken text. This method would allow the state to record additional
physical indicia of inebriation-the only aspect of the audio portion
of the videotape which should be considered admissible-without
running the risk that such evidence will be tainted with incriminat-
ing testimonial evidence.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Muniz, the United States Supreme Court held that the fifth
amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination, as
interpreted in Miranda,298 did not preclude the introduction at trial
of a videotape of a person suspected of operating a motor vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicant, despite the fact that, at the
time of the recording, the suspect had not been informed of his Mi-
randa rights. The Court held that the slurred nature of a suspect's
speech and related indicia of a lack of muscular coordination consti-
tuted physical, and not testimonial, evidence, and thus lay outside
the scope of Miranda's protections.
The Court also announced an exception to Miranda's protec-
tions for routine booking questions, ruling that incriminating testi-
mony delivered in response to those questions was admissible at
trial. Finally, the Court failed to apply the concept of implicit inter-
rogation to the administration of sobriety and breathalyzer tests,
holding that incriminating testimonial evidence obtained during
those procedures was admissible.
To arrive at these results, the Court felt it necessary to cloud its
argument by rearranging discussion of several issues. This rear-
rangement allowed it to avoid discussion of these issues where they
would have done the most damage to the Court's conclusion.
Unfortunately, the decision in this case is representative of
many recent cases, where a desire to eradicate what has been re-
garded as a pervasive evil has been responsible for the disregard by
the Court of the most basic rights guaranteed by the first eight
amendments to the Constitution.299 The fact that the opinion of the
298 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
299 See, e.g., Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (high-
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Court in this case was authored by Justice Brennan, an erstwhile
supporter of civil liberties, is indicative of the extent to which this
alarming trend has garnered supporters.
With the decision in this case, the Court has made yet another
inroad upon the protections of the fifth amendment as interpreted
in Miranda. Those protections, paid for so dearly over two centuries
ago, should not be disregarded so lightly.
JACQUES LEBOEUF
way sobriety checkpoint program did not violate the fourth amendment's prohibition of
unlawful searches and seizures); United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989) (use
of 'probabilistic' facts describing personal characteristics of drug couriers as a basis for a
finding of 'reasonable suspicion' necessary to justify a brief investigative detention of a
suspected drug courier did not violate the fourth amendment's prohibition of unlawful
searches and seizures); Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989)
(drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees without warrant, probable cause, or rea-
sonable suspicion did not violate the fourth amendment); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (requiring Customs Service employees seek-
ing promotions or transfers to positions involving drug interdiction or the carrying of
firearms to take urinalysis drug tests without any individualized suspicion of drug use
did not violate the fourth amendment).
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